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ences can be quite large, especially for housing.
For example, according to 1990 Census data, the
median housing price in New York is more than
three times that of the median housing price in
Cleveland.2 The question addressed in this paper
is whether the common practice of ignoring local
price variation in labor supply studies is as innocu-
ous as has generally been assumed.
I
n standard economic theory, labor supply
decisions depend on the complete set of
prices: the wages and the prices of relevant
consumption goods. Nonetheless, as Abbott
and Ashenfelter (1976) noted some 30 years ago,
economists generally have found it a useful
abstraction, in both theoretical and empirical
work, to ignore prices other than wages in labor
supply studies. For example, none of the empirical
results on labor supply discussed in the promi-
nent reviews of Pencavel (1986), Killingsworth
and Heckman (1986), or Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999) are derived by procedures that account for
variation in any price other than wages.1
However, most empirical work on labor does
use national datasets of individuals who live in
different locations and therefore face different
prices for locally priced goods. These price differ-
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income on labor supply typically differ by location. In particular, we show that the derivative of
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supply takes a form based on an implausible separability condition. Empirical evidence demon-
strates that the effect of price on labor supply is not a simple “up-or-down shift” that would be
required to meet the separability condition in our key proposition. (JEL J01, J21, R23)
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1 Abbott and Ashenfelter’s (1976) evaluation of labor supply in the
United States for the 1929-67 period exploits time-series changes
in relative prices but does not evaluate possible impacts of cross-
sectional variation (which, as they state, is “expected to be small”).
Some work conducts sensitivity analysis using Bureau of Labor
Statistics information on the cost of living to “adjust” wages. See,
for instance, DaVanzo, DeTray, and Greenberg (1973) and Masters
and Garfinkel (1977).
2 Gabriel and Rosenthal (2004) and Chen and Rosenthal (forthcoming)
show that massive housing price differences pertain across cities
even after careful adjustment for quality.
Dan A. Black is a professor in the Harris School, University of Chicago, and a senior fellow at the National Opinion Research Center; Natalia A.
Kolesnikova is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; and Lowell J. Taylor is a professor of economics and public policy at the
Heinz School, Carnegie Mellon University.
© 2008, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Federal Reserve System, the Board of Governors, or the regional Federal Reserve Banks. Articles may be reprinted, reproduced,
published, distributed, displayed, and transmitted in their entirety if copyright notice, author name(s), and full citation are included. Abstracts,
synopses, and other derivative works may be made only with prior written permission of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
2 VOLUME 4, NUMBER 1 2008 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTBlack, Kolesnikova, Taylor
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT VOLUME 4, NUMBER 1 2008 3
To examine the issue, we first present a simple
theoretical model: an economy in which people
live in different locations with differing levels of a
production or consumption amenity. Following
logic familiar in urban economics, (e.g., Roback,
1982), equilibrium prices will differ across loca-
tions. We demonstrate that labor supply behavior
also can vary across locations.
Next, we demonstrate that, when prices vary
across locations, local variation in prices can be
safely ignored only when preferences take a very
specific and peculiar form. We also show that the
responsiveness of labor supply to wage changes will
be the same across locations only if the responsive-
ness of labor supply to nonlabor income changes
is the same across locations.
In our third step we evaluate the potential
empirical importance of our theoretical observa-
tions. We present results obtained by using 1990
Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) of the 1990
U.S. Census that examine labor supply in the
nation’s 50 largest cities. We focus on the labor
force participation and hours decisions of white
married women aged 30 to 50—a group whose
labor decisions are quite responsive to changes in
wages and nonlabor income.
In general, we analyze the basic “building
block” empirical relationship that would underlie
any empirical analysis of labor supply for this
group: the relationship between nonlabor income
and labor supply. Our innovation is examining
this relationship for each of the 50 cities separately
and demonstrating the significant systematic vari-
ation that exists among them.
We find that the basic correlation—between
labor supply and nonlabor income—differs across
cities. For example, women who have relatively
high nonlabor income (primarily a husband’s
income) work relatively fewer hours and have
lower participation rates. An important observa-
tion, from our perspective, is that this anticipated
negative relationship is substantially more pro-
nounced in cities with inexpensive housing than
in cities with expensive housing.
A MODEL OF LOCAL LABOR
MARKETS WITH STONE-GEARY
PREFERENCES
We begin our study by presenting a simple
model of local price variation along the lines of
Roback (1982) and Haurin (1980). Locations differ
based on two criteria: (i) A location may be inher-
ently more pleasant (i.e, have a higher level of a
“consumption amenity,” such as nice weather),
or (ii) a location may be associated with inherently
higher productivity (e.g., owing to the presence of
a natural resource or an agglomeration of economies
in production). For simplicity we restrict attention
to cases in which people choose to live in one of
two cities.
In contrast to the standard urban location
models such as those of Roback (1982) or Haurin
(1980), which fix labor supply as a constant, we
allow labor supply to be a choice variable. Pref  er  -
ences are assumed to be Stone-Geary. This is a
particularly transparent form of utility, and as
Ashenfelter and Ham (1979) note, it is the simplest
functional form of utility used in applied empirical
work examining labor supply.3 We assume, in par-
ticular, that individual i has utility ui as a function
of a consumption good x, leisure l (which is scaled
so that 0 ￿ l ￿ 1), and an amenity level Aj (that is
specific to location j), according to a simple Stone-
Geary form as follows:
(1)                     
where c and δ are parameters that are common
across individuals and θij is a positive idiosyncratic
parameter that equals 1 for a typical individual, but
allows for the possibility that person i has a partic-
ular attraction, or distaste, for location j (as θij is
greater than, or less than, 1).
A person living in location j maximizes utility
subject to a budget constraint, pjx = wj￿1 – l￿ + N,
where pj is the price for the local consumption
good, wj is the local wage, and N is nonlabor
income. Assuming an interior solution pertains,
u A x c l
i ij j =
1 θ
δ δ − ( )
− ,
3 See also Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a discussion of the Stone-
Geary form, as well as other forms used in applied work on labor
supply.4 VOLUME 4, NUMBER 1 2008 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
demand for leisure and for the consumption good
are, respectively,
(2)            
and
(3)            
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation
(1) gives indirect utility for person in location 
(4)        
In equilibrium each individual chooses to live
in the location that yields the highest level of utility.
There are two locations: j = 1 or 2. We present two
cases: one with differing consumption amenities
and one with differing levels of productivity in
the locations.
Case 1: Differing Levels of the
Consumption Amenity
Suppose there is general agreement that
Location 1 is nicer than Location 2, A1 > A2, and
for the moment assume further that there are no
idiosyncratic differences in opinion about location,
so that θij = 1 for all individuals. Because workers
are equally productive in the two locations, wages
and w1 and w2 must be the same, say w.4 In an
equilibrium in which people live in both locations,
we must have Vi1 = Vi2, so using equation (4), it is
clear that p1 and p2 must solve
(5)        
Inspection of equation (5) confirms the intuitive
result that p1 > p2: The local consumption good is
more expensive in Location 1—the high-amenity
city.
This logic continues to hold if we add back
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the marginal individual θi1 = θi2 = 1, equation (5)
still characterizes equilibrium prices. In this
instance, however, some individuals will have a
strict preference with regard to location. For exam-
ple, an individual with θi1 > θi2 will have a strict
preference for Location 1 over Location 2.
We turn next to labor supply. Let h be the frac-
tion of time that a person works, h = 1 – l. From
equation (2), we have
(6)            
Although wages are the same in both locations,
the labor supply differs. In this example, h￿w,p1￿ >
h￿w,p2￿; individuals supply more labor when they
work in the more expensive city.
Suppose instead the focus is on the effect of a
wage change in a local labor market (studying
people who would not move in response to a small
change in the wage)5:
(7)               
Notice that in this example, the responsiveness of
the labor supply to a wage change is greater in the
inexpensive city than in the expensive city, 
In contrast, if we focus on how a change in
nonlabor income affects labor supply,
(8)                      
we find that the relationship is independent of the
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4 For simplicity, we are implicitly assuming that labor is the only factor
of production, so that firms will be indifferent in hiring if the wage
is the same in the two cities. This would not be true, for example, if
land were a major factor of production and land prices differed in
the two cities.
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5 In general, if the wage increases in a labor market, this factor can
attract new individuals to that location. Here, we are interested in
the effect on the labor supply of individuals who are already in the
market, for example, people who have an idiosyncratic taste for that
location.identical individuals may well supply less labor
in the high-wage city than in the low-wage city,
depending on the local price-wage combination.
Second, the responsiveness of labor supply to
changes in the wage or nonlabor income typically
varies across locations.
WHEN DOES PRICE VARIATION
MATTER FOR LOCAL LABOR
SUPPLY?
As noted previously, housing prices vary
widely across U.S. cities, presumably because of
differences in consumption or production ameni-
ties across these locations. The examples in the
previous section indicate that labor supply varies
across locations even in the unusually simple and
transparent case of Stone-Geary preferences. We
now turn to a more systematic investigation of
conditions on preferences under which price and
income effects on labor supply do not depend on
location. As is common in the literature, attention
is restricted to the case of quasi-homothetic pref-
erences (of which Stone-Geary is a special case).6
Given this common simplification, what further
restrictions are necessary to allow investigators to
ignore variation across locations when examining
labor supply?7
Under quasi-homothetic preferences, indirect
utility takes the form
(12)   
where, as before, p is the local price, w is the local
wage, and N is the nonlabor income. Using Roy’s
identity we derive the demand for leisure
V p w N p w N w p w , , = , , ( ) ( )+ + ( ) ( ) α β ,
Case 2: Differing Levels of Productivity
Now suppose that Locations 1 and 2 are viewed
as equally pleasant, A1 = A2, but productivity is
higher in Location 1 than in Location 2, so that 
w1 > w2. The equilibrium condition corresponding
to equation (5)—that the marginal individual is
indifferent between locations (i.e., Vi1= Vi2)—is then
(9)            
As for labor supply, in city j,
(10)        
In general, labor supply differs in the two locations,
but even with p1 > p2 and w1 > w2 the location that
will have the larger labor supply cannot be pre-
dicted. Similarly, in general 
and we cannot determine in which city the labor
supply is more responsive to wage changes. On
the other hand, in this example the derivative of
labor supply with respect to nonlabor income,
(11)                  
turns out to be independent of pj. Furthermore,
the derivative of labor supply with respect to non-
labor income does not depend on the local price,
p, but because in equilibrium the high-productivity
city has relatively higher wages, we expect to
observe that δh/δN will be smaller (in absolute
value) in the expensive city.
Our examples illustrate two important points.
First, cross-sectional variation in wages and prices
may be associated with variation in labor supply,
although that cross-sectional variation is of no
value for understanding the behavioral effect of
wage changes on labor supply. For instance, in our
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6 Quasi-homothetic preferences are useful because they preserve a
linear expansion path of homothetic preferences, but they do not
require the path to go through the origin. Thus, under quasi-
homothetic preferences, income elasticities of demand need not
equal 1, as is the case with homothetic preferences. 
7 We could attempt to analyze cases that are even more general, but
as we shall see, matters are sufficiently discouraging even for the
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follows:
Proposition 1 When preferences are quasi-
homothetic, 
is independent of location if and only if preferences
satisfy a separability condition β￿p,w￿ = β1￿p￿β2￿w￿.
Next consider the response of the demand for
leisure to wage changes, 
Again, the goal is to derive conditions under which  
does not depend on local prices, p. If b￿p,w￿ = b￿w￿,
as above, then the only other necessary condition
is that aw￿p,w￿ be independent of p. Now aw￿p,w￿
is independent of p if and only if it is equal to some
function of w only: aw￿p,w￿ = f￿w￿. Integrating both
parts with respect to w, we get a￿p,w￿ = F￿w￿ + c￿p￿.
Then the supply of hours of work takes an addi-
tively separable form, h￿p,w,N￿ = c￿p￿ + F￿w￿ + 
￿N + w￿b￿w￿.
We have established, therefore,
Proposition 2 When preferences are quasi-
homothetic, 
and 
are independent of location if and only if the
demand for leisure has the additively separable
form 
(15)  
Notice that in equation (15) the effect of local
price variation is to simply shift the labor supply
function up or down. In this case, it might suffice
to merely incorporate location-specific dummies
when estimating labor supply functions.8 Without
this separability, however, local price variation
would have a fundamental impact on the shape of
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(13) 
It then follows that hours of labor supply are
(14) 
where 
Consider the effect of the change in nonlabor
income on the labor supply, 
Obviously, δh/δN is independent of p (and thus is
the same across locations) if and only if b￿p,w￿￿
b￿w￿. The following claim provides the condition
under which this holds:
Claim  
Proof. The proof of sufficiency is trivial. To prove
necessity, we have
where 
The above observations can be summarized as
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8 In fact, in empirical work on labor supply, researchers generally do
not even take this simple step.in labor supplied in each city can be traced. Finding
data that correspond to such an experiment is a
formidable task. The following work instead focuses
exclusively on the sensitivity of labor supply to
nonlabor income. We can justify this focus with
the following result:
Proposition 3 In general, labor supply, h￿p,w,F￿,
depends on the price of the local good, the wage,
and full income, F = w + N.9
If the key relationship  is independent of p,
then  is independent of p.
To prove this proposition we consider first the
effect of a change in nonlabor income on labor
supply: 
This is independent of price, p, if and only if
(18)                  
Integrating both sides of  equation (18), we then
notice that labor supply must have the following
additively separable form:
(19)       
Similarly, the effect of the change in the wage on
labor supply does not depend on p if and only if
(20)                  
or, integrating both sides of equation (20),
(21)          
Compare the additive separability requirements
shown in equations (19) and (21). The latter takes
the same basic form but is more restrictive. It fol-
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These two propositions demonstrate that even
in the simple case of quasi-homothetic preferences,
rather strong conditions are necessary for location-
independent labor supply responses to income and
wage changes.
The Stone-Geary example used in the previous
section illustrates this point. Indirect utility can
be written in the form V = α￿p,w￿ + ￿N + w￿β￿p,w￿,
where
(16)     
(17)     
Since β￿p,w￿ is separable in p and w, the sepa-
rability condition of Proposition 1 is satisfied.
Recall from equation (6) that 
Obviously, this function does not have an addi-
tively separable form as required in Proposition 2.
So it is not surprising that the derivative of labor
supply with respect to nonlabor income, N, 
is independent of p, whereas the derivative of
leisure with respect to the wage, w, 
depends on p.
As noted earlier, labor supply studies generally
focus on the responsiveness of labor supply to
changes in wages. Here, we want to evaluate how
price variations, in addition to changes in wages,
affect the results. The ideal experiment would be
one in which wages are exogenously shifted in each
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9 Recall that full-time work entails h = 1, so that the maximum possible
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income, we do not want to specify any parametric
form because of concerns that results might be
sensitive to the functional form.11 Instead, we use
a nonparametric matching estimator. Two measures
of labor supply are used: annual hours of work and
an employment participation dummy variable.12
The data do not allow us to perform this analysis
for each city because they do not provide enough
support. Instead, we divide the sample roughly
into thirds and examine differences between the
most “expensive” cities (the 17 MSAs within the
top one-third of housing prices) and “inexpensive”
cities (the 17 MSAs with the lowest housing prices).
Our comparison of married women’s labor
supply in inexpensive and expensive cities then
follows three additional steps. The first step is to
divide households into deciles according to “non-
labor income” (which is predominately the hus-
band’s income). Then within each decile we
compare the labor supply of women who live in
the expensive cities relative to the labor supply of
women who live in inexpensive cities. The goal is
to compare the labor supply of otherwise similar
women, so we use an estimator that matches women
with exactly the same age and level of education.
Separate analyses also are conducted for women
with high school education and college education.
Thus, the second step is to match women living in
an expensive city with corresponding women liv-
ing in inexpensive cities (i.e., we match women in
each nonlabor income decile, di ￿i = 1,…,10￿, with
age and education vector x = X, to women with
these same characteristics living in inexpensive
cities). In the analysis that centers on annual work
hours, this is
(22) 
where h1,h0 are annual hours of work in expensive
and inexpensive cities, respectively. In the absence
of selection, this might be taken to be the causal
effect on labor supply (measured in hours per year)
of living in an expensive city relative to an inex-
pensive city. The third step is to average the quan-
∆ X d E h x X d E h x X d i i i , = | = , | = , , 1 0 ( ) ( )− ( )
is independent of the local price, p, 
is independent of the local price, p.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The theoretical considerations outlined in the
preceding section suggest that unless preferences
are strongly restricted, the responsiveness of labor
supply to nonlabor income and to the wage will
vary across locations. It is possible, of course, that
the differences are insignificant and do not pose a
problem for empirical work. We examine this pos-
sibility using a dataset of married white women—
a group that is likely to have substantial variation
in labor supply (e.g., in response to differences in
wage, nonlabor income, and possibly local prices).
Data used in the analysis are from the 1990 PUMS10;
data include married non-Hispanic white women,
aged 30 to 50, who live in the 50 largest metropol-
itan statistical areas (MSAs) in the United States.
One goal of this exploration is to see if there
are any systematic differences in labor supply
related to differences in local prices. We consider
the relationship between labor supply and non-
labor income; the latter term is defined as family
income minus the woman’s own total income.
Given previous research on married women’s labor
supply, an inverse relationship would be expected
between nonlabor income and labor supply ( i.e.,
leisure is likely a “normal good.”) The question
here is whether that relationship differs in a system-
atic way across cities.
Examining the relationship between nonlabor
income and married women’s labor supply in cross
section is far from “state of the art” in estimating
labor supply. Still, it seems a reasonable first pass
at the issue, especially given that our focus is not
on any estimated relationship per se but on differ-
ences in the relationships in expensive and inex-
pensive urban areas.
In our investigation of the differences in the









10 Data were provided by the Minnesota Population Center (Ruggles
et al., 2004).
11 See, for example, DaVanzo, DeTray, and Greenberg (1973).
12 We also repeated the analysis with several other measures of labor
force participation, such as an indicator of full-time employment.
The results remain essentially the same.(and statistically significant) for many of the non-
labor income deciles. For example, ninth-decile
women in expensive cities work considerably
longer hours than corresponding women in inex-
pensive cities. College-educated women in this
decile average 129 more work hours, whereas
women with a high school education work an
average of 89 hours more.
An apparent and striking pattern is shown in
Table 1 and Figure 1. First, as might be expected,
among these married women, leisure appears to
be a normal good; women with higher levels of
outside income generally work fewer hours per
year and have lower labor force participation rates.
More important, for our purposes, is that the rela-
tity in equation (22) across all women in each
decile di:
(23)             
where dFn￿x|di￿ is the national distribution of x in
the decile di.
The analysis is repeated using a second meas-
ure of labor supply—a labor force participation
dummy variable. When these empirical exercises
are performed separately for women with a high
school diploma and those with a college degree, x,
is simply an age vector.
Results are reported in Table 1. The difference
in annual hours of work between women living in
expensive and inexpensive cities is substantial
∆ ∆ n i i n d x d dF x i ( ) ∫ ( ) ( ) = | | ,
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Table 1
Differences in Annual Hours and Participation Rates Between Expensive and Inexpensive Locations
by Nonlabor Income Deciles
Women with a  Women with a 
All women high school diploma college degree
Change in Change in Change in Change in Change in Change in
annual  participation  annual  participation  annual  participation 
Nonlabor income decile hours rates hours rates hours rates
1 –117.34 –0.04 –136.1 –0.04 –78.08 –0.02
(14.23) (0.0065) (24.57) (0.012) (34.88) (0.016)
2 –75.46 –0.01 –75.72 0.00 –99.43 –0.02
(14.32)  (0.0063) (24.36) (0.011) (36.47) (0.016)
3 –54.14 –0.01 –19.42 0.00 –46.71 –0.01
(13.74) (0.0060) (23.39) (0.012) (33.98) (0.015)
4 –15.14 0.00 –28.97 –0.01 –20.59 0.00
(13.88) (0.0062) (23.63) (0.012) (37.16) (0.016)
5 –20.68 0.01 –51.79 0.00 –13.31 0.03
(13.31) (0.0063) (24.14) (0.012) (34.57) (0.015)
6 2.59 0.02 –39.52 0.00 59.98 0.05
(13.66) (0.0068) (24.14) (0.013) (31.66) (0.015)
7 12.47 0.01 –16.11 0.00 85.6 0.03
(14.38) (0.0072) (24.79) (0.013) (30.99) (0.015)
8 83.55 0.05 81.95 0.05 139.38 0.08
(14.62) (0.0076) (26.78) (0.014) (30.24) (0.015)
9 83.61 0.04 88.98 0.03 128.59 0.06
(15.80) (0.0083) (33.44) (0.017) (30.84) (0.016)
10 82.59 0.04 15.74 0.00 172.35 0.07
(18.45) (0.0098) (41.52) (0.023) (28.04) (0.015)
NOTE: Authors’ calculations, based on 5 percent 1990 PUMS data. The sample consists of white, non-Hispanic married women, aged 30
to 50. Bootstrapped standard errors using 999 replications are reported in parentheses.10 VOLUME 4, NUMBER 1 2008 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
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higher in expensive cities than in inexpensive
cities.
In short, the labor/leisure choice appears to not
conform to the additively separable form described
in Proposition 2; local prices do not merely shift





tionship between nonlabor income and labor sup-
ply is quite different for expensive and inexpen-
sive cities. At the very lowest levels of nonlabor
income (e.g., deciles 1 and 2), women in expensive
cities have lower labor supply than women in
inexpensive cities. The opposite is essentially true
for women in the high nonlabor income deciles;
among women with high nonlabor income, labor
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Variation Between Expensive and Inexpensive Locations in Annual Hours and Participation Rates,
by Nonlabor Income DecileThis work has a number of implications for
empirical strategies in estimating labor supply and
other policy research. First, our research makes
clear that empirical work should never use cross-
sectional variation in wages to estimate parameters
in labor supply models. We document significant
differences for married women in quantity of labor
supplied across cities that may have little connec-
tion with behavioral responses to cross-sectional
variation in wages.
Second, because labor supply elasticities vary
by location, researchers must be careful in inter-
preting results based on instrumental variable (IV)
strategies. For example, suppose an IV approach
is used in which the IV is the price of coal. Varia  -
tion in the price of coal arguably serves as an excel-
lent source of wage variation in the coal industry,
but the resulting estimates of the effect on labor
supply would apply only for regions where the
coal industry is a major employer. If local prices
differ in those regions from other parts of the coun-
try, the estimated relationships will not be general-
izable to the entire country.
Third, using a back-of-the-envelope example,
we show that the evidence in Table 1 is consistent
with the possibility that wage elasticities or labor
supply (for married women) are quite different
across cities. Notice that the Slutsky equation, in
elasticity form, gives the relationship
(24)                     
where εw is the observed wage elasticity of supply,
εH
w is the corresponding Hicksian elasticity (reflect-
ing the pure substitution effect), and εN is the elas-
ticity of labor supply with respect to nonlabor
income. Now consider college-educated married
women at the median level of nonlabor income. If
we take as causal the relationship drawn in Figure 1,
moving from the fourth to sixth deciles in income
we would estimate a nonlabor income elasticity,
εN, of –0.46 in the expensive cities and –0.29 in
the inexpensive cities. Suppose that the Hicksian
elasticity, εH
w, is 0.50 (and is the same in both
cities). We estimate that for the average woman at
the fourth decile wh/N is 0.57 in inexpensive









is generally negative (at least beyond the lowest
decile levels of N) and is smaller (in absolute value)
in the expensive city. This generalization holds
true for both high school– and college-educated
women.
Also, as noted, results are similar when “aver-
age hours” or “labor force participation rates” are
used as the measure of labor supply. Of note, in
these cities 66 percent of high school–educated
women and 70 percent of college-educated women
are employed on average. Thus, differences of 5 to
7 percentage points between expensive and inex-
pensive cities represent differentials of 8 to 10
percent, which seem (to us) quite substantial.
Our nonparametric approach does have one
disadvantage: The nonlabor income distribution
within each decile might differ somewhat for
women in expensive cities. An alternative flexible
parametric approach to estimation, described in
the Appendix, provides nearly identical inferences.
Our empirical findings are roughly consistent
with theoretical predictions in Case 2. In that
equilibrium example with Stone-Geary preferences,
the responsiveness of labor supply to nonlabor
income must be greater in inexpensive (low-
productivity) cities than expensive (high-
productivity) cities.
CONCLUSION
We describe a simple model to demonstrate
that the effects of wage and nonlabor income on
labor supply typically differ by location. In partic-
ular, we show the derivative of the labor supply
with respect to nonlabor income is independent of
price only when labor supply takes a form based
on an implausible separability condition.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the
effect of price on labor supply is not a simple “up-
or-down shift” that would be required to meet the
separability condition in our key proposition. For
example, among women with low nonlabor income,
living in an inexpensive city is associated with
higher labor force participation and longer work
hours, whereas among women with high nonlabor
income, living in an inexpensive city is associated
with lower labor force participation and shorter
work hours.
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cities and 0.61 in expensive cities.13 Thus, the
uncompensated labor supply elasticity is more
than a third higher in expensive cities than inex-
pensive cities, 0.33 versus 0.24.
Fourth, as an example of an application to
policy-related research, locational differences
may occur in the response of female labor supply
to changes in taxes. Changes in income taxes, for
instance, would have different effects in different
cities. A closely related implication centers on the
analysis of social welfare policy. (Recall, for exam-
ple, that wives of husbands with low earnings work
less in more expensive cities.) We believe that fur-
ther analysis of policy implications is warranted.
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The empirical inferences in Table 1 are based on an entirely nonparametric approach. We divided
our sample into 10 nonlabor income deciles and compared labor supply across women within each of
these cells. Our primary finding is that for women in low nonlabor income deciles, the labor supply is
lower in expensive cities than in inexpensive cites, whereas for women in high nonlabor income deciles,
labor supply is higher in expensive cities than in inexpensive cities.
Here we present a flexible parametric approach that leads to this same inference. We estimate labor
supply regressions with the independent variables age (entered as 21 dummy variables for each age, 30 to
50 years inclusive) and nonlabor income (entered as a fourth-order polynomial). We estimate regressions—
separately for high school–educated women and college-educated women, as well as for each labor supply
variable (employment and hours worked)—using the sample of women from the expensive cities. We
similarly estimate corresponding regressions for the sample of women from the inexpensive cities. Then
for each woman i who lives in the expensive cities, we estimate the outcome of interest y ˆ1i (e.g., “predicted”
employment, or “predicted” hours worked) using the regression parameter from the expensive city, and
similarly estimate y ˆ0i using regression parameters from the inexpensive city. Finally, we form the estimated
gap,
,
for each individual. Notice that this last quantity is the “impact of the treatment on the treated,” where
the “treatment” is location in an expensive city rather than an inexpensive city.
To summarize findings in a manner comparable to Table 1, we aggregate estimates into deciles of
nonlabor income. Results are presented in Table A1. Bootstrapped standard errors using 999 replications
are reported in parentheses.14
ˆ ˆ ˆ ∆i i i y y = 1 0 −
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Table A1
Differences in Annual Hours and Participation Rates Between Expensive and Inexpensive Locations
by Nonlabor Income Deciles, Parametric Approach
Women with a  Women with a 
high school diploma college degree
Change in Change in Change in Change in
Nonlabor income decile annual hours participation rates annual hours participation rates
1 –128.7 –0.034 –118.1 –0.027
(22.04) (0.0110) (34.23) (0.0143)
2 –93.4 –0.021 –72.5 –0.016
(12.42) (0.0066) (17.76) (0.0079)
3 –68.6 –0.013 –36.6 –0.002
(11.10) (0.0059) (16.07) (0.0074)
4 –47.1 –0.005 –9.5 0.009
(10.82) (0.0056) (15.23) (0.0071)
5 –28.1 0.001 19.1 0.021
(10.26) (0.0056) (14.59) (0.0066)
6 –2.1 0.01 46.5 0.032
(11.15) (0.0056) (14.18) (0.0066)
7 23.8 0.019 76.5 0.045
(12.73) (0.0061) (14.59) (0.0071)
8 55.3 0.030 108.6 0.058
(15.28) (0.0077) (17.27) (0.0082)
9 87.5 0.042 143.5 0.075
(20.48) (0.0102) (20.89) (0.0099)
10 81.6 0.036 123.1 0.066
(38.06) (0.0207) (30.26) (0.0151)
NOTE: Authors’ calculations, based on 1990 PUMS data. The sample consists of all married, white, non-Hispanic women between the
ages of 30 and 50 inclusive. The covariates are nonlabor income and age. Using a fourth-order polynomial, we use the sample of women
from expensive cities to estimate the outcome of interest, which we denote y ˆ1i for the ith women. Using the sample of women from
inexpensive cities, we estimate parameters for a fourth-order polynomial and then evaluate the function using the covariates of women
from the expensive city sample, which we denote y ˆ0i for the ith women. We then form the parameter for the “impact of treatment on the
treated” as ∆ ˆi = y ˆ1i – y ˆ0i. We then aggregate estimates into deciles of nonlabor income. Bootstrapped standard errors using 999 replications
are reported in parentheses.